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'Dicta Observes
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION MEETING
The annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association
will be held at the Antlers Hotel, Colorado Springs, on September 14th and 15th. The first session will convene Friday,
September 14th, at 10:30 A. M. Reports will be submitted
of the work of the Association for the past two years.
An outstanding feature of the meeting will be an exhaustive discussion of the question of incorporating the State
Bar. The proposition is to receive lengthy and careful attention and members will be invited to express their opinions for
and against.
Entertainment has been arranged for after and between
sessions.
A banquet will be held Saturday evening and excellent
speakers have been secured. A tribute will be paid to the
founders of the Colorado Bar Association.

DID YOU KNOWBy GERALD E. WELCH, Associate Editor
HAT the beneficiary of a life insurance policy has such
a vested interest, that the insured's reserved right to
change the beneficiary does not entitle him to surrender
and cancel the policy without the beneficiary's consent?
A first impression might be that-since the insured has
reserved the right to change the beneficiary-the interest of
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the named beneficiary is such a defeasible and contingent one
that the policy may be dealt with freely and independently
of any consent by the beneficiary. However, the State of
Colorado in Hill v. Capitol Life Insurance Company,
(1932) 91 Colo. 300, 14 P. (2d) 1006, adopted the majority rule that, under a policy providing for the changing of
the beneficiary at pleasure, the insured by agreement with the
insurer could not surrender and cancel the policy without the
beneficiary's consent, unless permitted to do so by the terms
of the contract. The case involved an action by the widow
of the insured who brought suit to collect upon a life insurance policy, the first year's premium of which was paid with
a note on which nothing was paid and which within the year
was surrendered in exchange for the surrender and cancellation of the policy. The widow in suing upon the policy
contended that without her consent the cancellation was not
effective, and her contention was upheld, the court limiting
the right of the insured to deal with the policy strictly to the
provisions of the contract of insurance.
This case is relied upon by insurers to require a person
who is insured to obtain the consent of the named beneficiary
to a conversion of a policy when the policy does not specifically provide for such conversion.

That a payment to the Clerk of the Court is not a payment into court so as to protect the payer in the absence of a
court order directing the payment into court?
In order to protect their clients against the possibility of
duplicating payments, as in a case where the plaintiff who
recovers judgment is a statutory agent to bring the suit, attorneys sometimes pay the amount of the judgment to the Clerk
of the Court and regard it as a payment into court. The
State of Colorado in two early cases, Brown et al. v. People
for use, etc., (1876) 3 Colo. Rep. 115; and People for use,
etc. v. Cobb, (1897) 10 Colo. App. 478, 51 P. 523" held a
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payment to the Clerk of the Court is not a payment into
court so as to protect the payer in the absence of legal authority or some order of the court authorizing the Clerk to receive
it.

The two quotations following illustrate the point involved:
"The authorities are Uniform, so far as I am able to find, that
payment to the clerk of money on a judgment or execution, obtained
in the court of which he is clerk, is not payment. He is not authorized
to receive it. It is not a payment into court, unless made by order of
court, or the command in the writ so directs." Brown et al. v. People
for use, etc., 3 Colo. Rep. 115, at 124.
"An order by virtue of which money is paid into court must come
from the court itself, and an entry by the clerk of money as being in
court, no matter in what form, or in what books, without such order
is nugatory." People for use, etc. v. Cobb, 10 Colo. App. 478, at
483, 51 P. 523, 525.
(Contributions are solicited which deal with points or doctrines
of law, with particular emphasis on Colorado law, not commonly
known, or are unusual, and of informative value to the Bar. Address
"Dicta"-"DID YOU KNOW--"

DISBARMENT FOR FAILURE TO PAY BAR
ASSOCIATION DUES
Nearly 200 Mississippi attorneys were barred from
practicing in the state supreme court by a ruling handed down
by the high tribunal, sitting en banc, citing failure to comply
with a section of the laws of 1932, requiring payment of $5
annually as dues to the Mississippi State Bar.
Section 25, chapter 121, of the state code, enacted by
the legislature two years ago when the lawmakers reorganized the old state bar association, makes it compulsory that
every attorney in the state hold membership in the newly
organized state bar and provides each shall pay $5 a year
dues.-Case and Comment.

WILLARD TELLER-A STUDY IN CONTRAST

By H.

ROBINSON, JR.*

HE clients had waited in the reception room for fifteen
minutes. In the adjoining office, a man furiously studied
a buckram-bound legal volume. He seemed utterly unaware of his clients although they had been announced to
him some time before. Suddenly he glanced up from his
reading, saw that someone was waiting for him, and frowned.
"Come in," he grunted. "Sit down. What's your
trouble?"
This reception was typical of Willard Teller, one of the
keenest lawyers in the state. As one man once remarked, the
best recognition Willard Teller ever "awarded even his closest
friends was a nod or a grunt."'
Perhaps the life of no other man presents more idiosyncracies, more contrasts, more unexplainable quirks than that
of Willard Teller. Keen and intelligent, he could at times be
extremely bigoted and illogical. Stern and cold, he was also
kindly and humorous. He was orthodox and recusant. In
short he was a confusing series of synonyms and anonyms of
character, so much so, that any attempt to draw an adequate
word-picture of the man is almost impossible.
One senses that Willard Teller was a man of firm convictions. He had an overabundant capacity of being right,
coupled with the serene knowledge of that capacity. Unfortunately, neither of these qualities permit the formation of
close friendships. Nor does the power of speech, which can on
occasion hurl words, sparkling and crackling, like forked
lightning, upon the heads of luckless opponents, encourage
intimacy. For though great ability may command respect, it
will not of itself bring friendship.
Hence Willard Teller was a solitary man. His clients
seldom understood or appreciated him, save to recognize his
ability as an attorney. But their lack of appreciation was
mutual; for Teller was gruff and brusque to them all, irregardless of their wealth or influence. His fellow lawyers,
while distinctly respectful of his legal ability, made no pre*Member of the Denver Bar.
(1) Thomas F. Dawson, in0erview with Samuel L. Lindscott, manuscript written October 24, 1921; on file
at State Museum.
284
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tense of their lack of sympathetic understanding of the man.
Indifferent to publicity-in fact at times openly hostile to
reporters, seemingly withholding information for the pure
joy of irking them-he made most of the newspapers of the
day his avowed enemies. He shunned all clubs and organizations. He despised saloons. He rarely made any public appearances, except an occasional speech in behalf of his brother
(Henry M. Teller) during the campaigns of the Senator, or
except an occasional appearance as a toastmaster. And yet,
he was an orator of recognized ability, and a toastmaster
much sought after. He never entered into the struggle for
political renown because he believed that "a lawyer cannot become a politician and do justice to his profession." '
And
yet he was offered the Republican nomination for governor
of this state, at a time when the nomination was equivalent
to election. Needless to say, he refused the offer without a
moment's consideration.
Yes, Willard Teller was a lonely, solitary man. And yet
--- contrast upon contrast-he enjoyed a companionship and
a love that few men knew. Mrs. Teller was his devoted wife
and his constant companion. Shunning all other women,
Willard Teller dedicated his life to Mrs. Teller. Perhaps one
should add-and to his jealous mistress, the law. If Mrs.
Teller could draw her husband's portrait it would undoubtedly picture him as a kindly, tender, sympathetic and understanding man. Strikingly enough, her portrait would not be
far from being accurate.
In the mind of Willard Teller, right and wrong occupied
separate and very distinct compartments, and neither one was
ever confused with the other. He believed in the inherent
honesty of every man, and for that reason would never sign
or draw a stipulation. To him the word of any man was
sufficient and if it were not, then to put that word in writing
was of no value. Sham, trickery, and make-believe in living
and in law he could not and did not tolerate. To every
question whether it pertained to life, love, or business, whether
it was academic or real, whether it affected himself or others,
Willard Teller admitted only one answer-the answer which
(2)

Denver Times, October 5, 1905.
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was right. Perhaps he did not know the correct answer, yet
he strove to seek it and so far as he was concerned, he eventually found it. Not that he was egotistical, rather that to
him right and justice were inherently bound up in nature and
the answer therefore could be found if only diligently sought.
Perhaps this philosophical attitude was responsible for his
sternness, his devotion to duty, his lack of pretense and his
hatred of prestidigitation. Passion or prejudice seldom, if
ever, swayed him; principle and conviction had a powerful
influence upon him. No better illustration of this assertion
is needed than in the fact that he once voted against his
brother, Henry M. Teller, to whom he was heartily devoted.
When the split came in the Republican party, Henry M.
Teller lined up with the Silver Republicans. Willard Teller
believed in the principles of metalism as outlined by the regular Republican convention. That year he went to the polls
and voted against the ticket which had the power to make his
brother a United States Senator.
Such is the completed portrait of Willard Teller-a
quiet, unassuming citizen who did his work as a lawyer, excellently, and whose life was expended in the pursuit of legal
learning, and in the company of his wife. It was a life quietly
and scholarly spent. Its most colorful public moments came
from the practice of the law.
Willard Teller was born-the inevitable cliche of biography--on a farm in Allegany County, New York, on
April 17, 1834. His father, John Teller, a farmer of moderate means, was a descendant of Colonial Dutch stock, and
his mother, Charlotte Moore, was a member of.a family
which had long resided in New England. Willard was named
after his maternal grandfather.
Until he was sixteen, Willard attended the district
school. Later he was enrolled in the academies at Rushford.
Then he studied at Alfred University, and in his spare time,
he taught in the elementary school. In 1855 he entered Oberlin, from which College, he was graduated in 1858 with a
Bachelor of Arts degree.
After his graduation, he began the reading of law in the
office of Judge Martin Grover, a judge in the New York
Court of Appeals. In the year that Willard started his study
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of law, Henry M. Teller, who had also read law in Judge
Grover's office, was admitted to the New York Bar. Willard,
however, completed his legal education in the office of Lebedie Kendall at Angelica and was admitted to the bar in Buffalo, in 1860.'
He commenced practice at Olean, Cattaraugus County,
New York. There he met Weltha A. Gleason. By Christmas
time of the following year, he had married her. While his
courtship was progressing rapidly, his legal business had remained virtually at a standstill, and in an effort to increase
his income, he moved to Morrison, Illinois, in 1861.
Henry M. Teller and H. A. Johnson had formed a partnership there in 1858, but gold fever had lured Johnson to
Colorado in 1860, and a year later Henry Teller had followed him. Before he left he offered to turn the business of
the firm over to Willard and this offer was accepted. The
Willard Tellers remained in Morrison until 1864, when heeding the repeated requests of Henry, who was now practicing
in Central City, they came to Colorado.
From 1864 until 1877, the Teller brothers practiced in
Central City. When the mineral wealth of that town began
to disappear, the Tellers moved to Denver where they practiced together until 1882, the year that Henry M. Teller was
selected as Secretary of the Interior. Harper M. Orahood, who
was associated with Teller and Teller, took Henry M. Teller's place and the firm was then known as Teller and Orahood, with Orahood doing most of the office work and Teller
assuming the Court practice. Some years later, November 1,
1900, Clayton C. Dorsey replaced Orahood, and the new firm
was known as Teller and Dorsey.
This partnership was the last one Teller formed and he
was forced to withdraw from it several years before his death
because of ill health. His last years were miserable ones. For
three years he suffered with arteriosclerosis, succumbing to the
disease on October 4, 1905, and two days later he was interred at Fairmount Cemetery. On the day of his funeral the
courts of the city were closed and Judge Peter Palmer of the
West Side Courts eulogized the memory of the man. His
(3)

Byer's History of Colorado (1901),

Vol. 1, Enc'y. of Biography.

288

DICTA

death was the cause for the only public display Teller ever
made.
Willard Teller was pre-eminently a lawyer. His life, on
the surface, was the cold, unemotional life of reason. For a
half-century, he held a position at the bar of Colorado, second
only to that of his more distinguished brother, Henry. And
there are many who place him above the Senator as did Judge
Hallett, who unqualifiedly spoke of Willard Teller as the best
attorney in Colorado.
In spite of his sarcastic speech, Willard Teller commanded the respect of any court in which he practiced. Judge
Hallett relates that Teller once presented a motion which
seemed to be entirely without merit. The Judge had intended
to permit Teller to make only a perfunctory argument and
then to overrule the motion. Teller, however, presented such
an able and clever argument, that Judge Hallett not only
listened to it in its entirety, but also sustained the motion.
Judge Hallett and Willard Teller were the best of friends,
but they frequently clashed in the court-room. Many of the
most entertaining of the Hallett legends are spun around Willard Teller. Perhaps the best known one concerns the little
black dog that Teller carried with him. The dog, a three and
one-half pound black and tan, fitted into Teller's coat pocket,
and went everywhere with Teller, even to Court. Because the
Tellers' were childless, friends jokingly referred to the dog as
the "Teller Baby."
One day Teller was presenting an argument in Judge
Hallett's court. The dog became thirsty and Teller drew
some water in a drinking glass for the dog. Judge Hallett,
noticing the procedure, loudly inquired, "Mr. Teller, is your
dog drinking from my glass?"
"Yes, your Honor, but that is perfectly all right," composedly replied Teller, "I washed out the glass first."
Another time, Judge Hallett constantly overruled objections Teller was making to the introduction of certain evidence, but Teller continued to object. Finally Hallett impatiently exclaimed, "If I am wrong, you know how to correct me."
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"Yes," replied Teller, "I've corrected you too many
times not to know how to do it again."
As frequently, however, Teller bore the brunt of the
witticism. Judge Hallett, threatening to fine Teller for contempt during an important trial, told him to be seated.
"But, if it pleases your Honor," objected Teller, "you
cannot expect us to sit here like Stoughton Bottles."
"Quite enough of that, Mr. Teller," retorted the judge,
"you are an officer of the Court, and we cannot permit the
comparison of an officer of the court to such an ignominious
vessel as a Stoughton Bottle."
The press of the day delighted in featuring the bon-mots
of these two men, partially, one suspects, because neither
Hallett, nor Teller, were very sympathetic toward the papers
or their reporters. As a matter of fact, the judge and the lawyer, the best of friends, enjoyed their verbal encounters as
much as football players revel in a scrimmage, which may appear to spectators to be conducted with the most murderous
intentions.
Illustrative of the glee which any discomfiture or embarrassment to Willard Teller aroused in the newspapers is
the incident which occurred in Denver and Rio Grande-Santa
Fe fight over the Royal Gorge. A suit was brought by the
attorney-general of Colorado to enjoin the Santa Fe from
operating in this state, and a suit was filed in Judge Bowen's
court at Alamosa for the cancellation of the Santa Fe's thirty-year lease of the Rio Grande, and its right-of-way. As
attorney for the Santa Fe railroad, Teller asked for a change
of venue, alleging in unmistakable language, that Bowen was
partial and that justice could not be obtained in his court.
Judge Bowen not only denied the motion, but in his
decree even went so far as to issue a restraining order preventing the Santa Fe from operating in Colorado in spite of the
fact that this matter was not before him. Teller asked and
received a copy of the Court's opinion, and after much difficulty, finally boarded a train for Denver where be intended to
institute further legal action.
The battle between the roads had been a long and bitter
one, and so quite naturally the employees of the roads took a
very definite stand in favor of their employer, doing whatever
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was in their power to injure or halt the enemy road. On the
train which Teller was riding to Denver was an employee of
the Denver &4Rio Grande railroad. The other side of Palmer
Lake, this employee, a conductor, uncoupled the car in which
Teller was riding and then disabled the locomotive. Of
course, the press, whose sympathy was naturally with the
Denver road, made all manner of fun at Teller sitting and
fuming on a stranded train at Palmer Lake.
Teller, however, finally arrived in Denver, and had the
case brought up before Judge Hallett, who declared Judge
Bowen's decision void. In the meantime, the Rio Grande,
lead by A. C. Hunt, and armed with the authority of Bowen's
decision forcibly captured the Santa Fe road by a coup
d'etat, within the short period of twenty-four hours; and
when Bowen learned of Hallett's decision, he ordered the Rio
Grande placed in the hands of a receiver.
Once again Teller rushed into the Federal Court and
demanded a termination of the receivership; and Judge Hallett issued an order requiring that the receiver be discharged
and the road be turned back to the Santa Fe within three days.
The Rio Grande countered this move by requesting that the
Santa Fe be restrained from using the Rio Grande right-ofway. Their request was granted, and a new receiver appointed. The battle, however, came to an end with dramatic,
although disappointing, suddenness. One day Gould announced that he had acquired the controlling interest in the
Denver and Rio Graide.'
For over thirty years, Teller was identified with practically every important railroad case which was tried or which
arose in Colorado. He was counsel for the Union Pacific,
the Santa Fe, and the Colorado Central railroads. One has
but to thumb through those volumes of the Colorado reports
from Volume One to the April term of Court in 1900, to
see the name of Willard Teller appearing on nearly every one
of the railroad cases.
And one has but to turn the pages to see his name as
counsel on nearly all the important mining and irrigation
cases. For example, during the year 1879, he was identified
(4) Santa Fe Magazine, January, 1923, Grand Canyon War, Cy Warman, page
59, Sec. 99, U. S. 463, 5 Colo. 60, 1879; 5 Colo. 39, 1879.
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with over fifteen cases in which the Supreme Court announced
its decisions. He was member of counsel in the Apex and
Pelican-Dives cases. He was counsel for Samuel Lindscott,
in the Lucky case.
Lindscott, in discussing this suit in later years, tells how
Teller made a thorough examination of the mine, and how
he appeared thoroughly acquainted with mining practice and
technique. When the trial was had, Willard Teller seemed to
be familiar with every decision and every precedent cited by
either counsel. "And," adds Lindscott, "I never knew Willard to make a mistake on a legal point."
Judge W. R. Grosline once said that the "Teller boys"
were the outstanding lawyers in Colorado, especially brilliant
on any phase of mining law. And one of the opposing counsels from New York, in a famous mining case,.once said, "I
was never afraid of any man on a mining case except the
'Tellers' of Colorado. Of them, I had good cause to fear."
Mary Lathrop paid this tribute to the man: "Willard Teller
and Hugh Butler made irrigation and mining law, and Hallett announced it."
Teller was counsel in some of the very important cases;
and he was likewise associated with some highly sensational
ones. He and Amos Steck were attorneys for Mrs. Tabor
when she secured her divorce. He was the attorney for Bush,
repudiated agent of Tabor, in one of the most highly flavored
trials in Colorado's history. He was also an attorney in the
famous Daniels case. 5
Teller's success at the bar can be traced, perhaps, to his
ability to concentrate. He warded off the disturbances easily,
oblivious to all else when studying. He held cases and principles firmly in mind, and his excellent memory seldom betrayed him. His ability as a cross-examiner has never been
questioned. Illustrative of his memorizing ability, it is said
that he was familiar with French, Greek, Latin, and Spanish.
In spite of his vast practice, he found time to undertake
many cases without remuneration. Perhaps the outstanding
(5) See Tabor vs. Bush, and People vs. Tabor. The briefs for appeal of these
cases, which lie in the Supreme Court, but which never came up for argument because
the case was dismissed, present some of the most entertaining legal reading there is, and
serve to throw a new light on some of the many angles to the life of Tabor which has
never been reported.
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case of this nature which he handled was the school episode
at Central City. After the Civil War, the residents of Central
City attempted to exclude negro children from attending the
public school. Teller, who had been prominently identified
with the anti-slavery movement in Illinois, even to aiding
escaping negroes, voluntarily undertook the cause of the negro
children and secured a writ of mandamus compelling the authorities to admit all children, regardless of race or color, to
the public schools.
I have said that beneath his gruff exterior, Willard Teller
was a kindly man. Judge Dennison will subscribe to that
statement. When the Judge was very young, he was trying a
case in Judge Hallett's court. Hallett ruled against him concerning the proper forms of action to bring. Teller introduced
himself and proceeded to show Dennison how to plead the
case properly. Another instance of his kindliness, which the
late Governor Ammons frequently repeated was as follows:
One rainy day, Willard Teller was walking down the boardwalk, which was Denver's only sidewalk in those early days,
when a poor old woman who was just ahead of him dropped
a sack full of potatoes. Teller immediately set himself to the
task of picking up the potatoes, which were hopelessly scattered into the muddy holes of the street and gutter, much to
the detriment of his clothing, which became mud-bespattered,
Teller gathered together all the potatoes and presented the
sack full to the woman. He then courtly bowed, and turning
aside her thanks, quickly strode into the entrance of the Barclay block, where his offices were then situated.
All unconsciously, Willard Teller wrote his own epitaph. The occasion was the memorial to another lawyer.'
In his speech in praise of the deceased, Teller set forth clearly
the pathway, and perhaps all unconsciously, which his
own life had taken, he said: "The life, services, and death of
the ablest and best of the legal profession, are ordinarily, and
too often, left without any record more enduring than the
recollection of his colleagues at the bar, or on the bench than
which nothing is more ephemeral. In other professions and
callings the record of its foremost men is written in such ways
(6)

16 Colo., XVIII.
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and characters as serve to attract the attention of the masses,
and make him temporarily, or for all times, seen and known
of men-not so with the lawyer, who, during a life, longer or
shorter, has been only a lawyer. His victories and achievements are won, not by accident, nor by stirring words, nor
emotional appeals; not by arguments addressed to friendly
minds and sympathetic listeners, as is the case, in many instances, in political warfare, on the stump or in the halls of
legislation. Neither have such efforts been the result of deliberate and careful preparation in the library, like those of
the statesman, who is allowed his own time to prepare and
deliver what he will say. Unlike all of these, the lawyer usually finds himself bound to make his greatest and best efforts
amid, or at the close, perhaps, of a lengthy or exhaustive trial,
in which he must attempt, at least, to apply great fundamental legal principles to a new state of facts-facts, which
are constantly varying from hour to hour, thus rendering the
exercise of all his powers of discrimination and reasoning, in
the highest degree, immediate and necessary without disparagement to either of the other professions, or to the ability or
pretenses of ability, or to the character of those who are more
strictly deemed public men, it must be admitted that the evidences of character and ability afforded by a reputation as a
lawyer in the front rank of his profession is, beyond all question, superior to that which is offered by the holding of any
mere public position, or office ever has, or in itself can ever,
afford."
The last written tribute to Willard Teller appeared in
the Colorado Bar Association Reports.' The resolution
there presented states:
"Willard Teller was in every sense of the word a great
lawyer, he was esteemed both by the Bench and by the Bar as
a man in every way above reproach. His integrity as a man
and the uprighteousness of his character as a lawyer was
never questioned. He never practiced nor tolerated the tricks
of a shyster. He sought diligently for the rights of his client,
but never stooped to win a case by practices that might induce
the court unwittingly to render an unjust judgment."'
(7) 8 Colo., Bar Reports.
(8) Thb writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Mr. Clayton Dorsey,
Judge James Teller, and Mr. A. L. Doud for much of the information which they so
willingly supplied.

ictaphun_
OPENING FOR UNEMPLOYED, I. E., REPUBLICAN LAWYER
From San Antonio, on stationery bearing those stirring words,
"Remember the Alamo," comes a letter to "Honorable Albert Gould,
Attorney, Sect'y. of the Denver Bar Association Or To Whom It May
Concern," reading, in very small part indeed, thusly:
"Kind Sir:-Pardon. I am taking the liberty of writing to you,
and see if you won't kindly refer the enclosures as well as this letter, to
one of your able-Promotion-as well as Corporate, Attorneys, and
kindly request of them, or him rather; after thorough investigation into
the merits of my proposition-represent me as 'Associate Counsel,'
namely; * * * We will follow the methods of other well organized
corporation, as to our physical years, and our Officers-Directors shall be
elective, except in the internery-they may be appointive-at the outset • * *"
YOU ASKED FOR IT, JUDGE, or
CHICKENS COME HOME TO ROOST
An anonymous friend suggests that Judge Denison add to his
collection the following excerpt from Williams v. Smith, 76 Colo. 152,
opinion by Denison, J.:
"The defendant demurs on various grounds, all of which amount
to insufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. September 11 th,
the defendant answered, thereby waiving the demurrer."

WHY PICK ON NORTH DAKOTA?
Recently there was circulated in North Dakota a printed petitiorn
proposing that the people of the state enact the following as an initiated
measure:
"Sec. 1. No conviction of felony heretofore or hereafter had under
the laws of the United States or of any other state than the State of
North Dakota shall be deemed a conviction of a felony under the constitution or statutes of this state, unless the crime for which the conviction be had be deemed a felony under the laws of this state, and no
court shall construe the constitution or any statutory provision of the
state of North Dakota otherwise.
"Sec. 2. Repeal-All acts or parts-of acts in conflict with the
provisions of this act are hereby repealed."
The committee for the petitioners includes two lawyers of the
State.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES-TRUST DEED-PRIORITY-Tolland Co.

vs.

The First State Bank of Keenesburg et al.-No. 13532-Decided
July 23, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hiltiard.
A controversy over certain funds in the registry of the CourtTolland Co. claimed the proceeds of a sale of a crop of beets under a
deed of trust and the First State Bank of Keenesburg laid claim to same
under a chattel mortgage. The latter prevailed below.
1. A current crop, such as beets, growing from the season's
planting, may be mortgaged as a chattel.
2. A chattel mortgage conveys title to the chattels subject to retention of the mortgagor.
3. A deed of trust is merely a lien.
4. A chattel mortgage of the crops by the owner in possession
operates in law as a severance of them so that they will not pass under
a mortgage of the land, even though the mortgage antedates the chattel
mortgage where the entry after default and selling of the real estate is
made subsequent to the chattel mortgage.
5. Even though the mortgage or deed of trust gives a lien upon
the proceeds of the income they belong to the mortgagor until possession
of the mortgaged premises is taken.
6. The chattel mortgage is not invalid although an acknowledgment was taken by an officer of the mortgagee corporation.---udgment

affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REDUCTION oF COMPENSATION FOR
WILFUL VIOLATION OF SAFETY RULE--Clayton Coal Co. et al.

vs. De Santis et al.-No. 13559-Decided July 23, 1934Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
De Santis sustained an accidental injury while working for Clayton Coal Co. The company employed no regular shot-firer and it was
customary for the diggers to fire their own shots. He lighted the fuse
on five shots and one missed fire, and after waiting fifteen minutes he
returned and the missed shot exploded destroying the vision of his right
eye and causing other injuries. He was awarded compensation by the
commission, and the company and insurer claimed that it should be reduced 50%o by reason of his wilful failure to obey reasonable rule of
safety.
The District Court affirmed the judgment of the commission for
full compensation.
1. Section 3594, C. L. 1921, which provides that where a shot
has misfired and where fuse is used no person shall enter such working
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place until four hours have elapsed from the time of such misfiring, has
no application to a compensation case.
2. The Workman's Compensation Act has abolished the defense
of contributory negligence where the workman's want of care is not
wilful.
3. Only where the employer has adopted a rule for the safety of
the workmen and that rule is a reasonable one, and a workman wilfully
fails to obey it, that the compensation of the workman is reduced 50%.
4. Where the evidence shows that the employer had no rule relating to the conduct of workmen where there is a mis-shot, and the
evidence further shows that it was the custom among the workmen to
wait fifteen minutes after a mis-shot before going back, a 50% reduction
of compensation does not apply.-Judgment affirmed.

JUDGMENTS-INTEREST-DISCRIMINATION IN ALLOWANCE OF INTEREST-ESTOPPEL--Charles B. Myers vs. Colorado Pulp and
Paper Co.-No. 13556-Decided July 23, 1934--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Hilliard.
To a decree denying certain general creditors interest on their allowed claims, and at the legal rate claimed by them, or 4%, which was
allowed all other like creditors, the creditors suffering the discriminatory
judgment bring error. In the receivership matter which was formerly
before the Supreme Court in an earlier case, cause was remanded with
the directions that general creditors receive 100% with legal interest.
Thereafter, certain of the creditors stipulated to accept the face of their
claims with 4% interest, but not objecting creditors; they never signed
the stipulation and pursued their claims with interest in the Court
below, and the Court below entered an order giving the creditors who
stipulated the face of their claim the 4%, but that the particular creditors objecting should be paid the face of their claims with no interest,
on the ground that they had unnecessarily delayed the Court by their
proceedings and increased the costs of the case.
1. The fact that certain creditors objected to the allowance of
their claims without including the full legal interest or, at least, the
interest allowed other creditors, and thereby delaying the proceedings
and incurring additional expenses is no sufficient ground for the Court
below to penalize such creditors and refuse to allow them interest.
This was a discrimination which should not be upheld.
2. Motion to dismiss the writ on the ground that the objecting
creditor's attorney had withdrawn from the clerk's office certain checks
covering the sums awarded where the checks had not been cashed, does
not estop them from pursuing the writ of error.--Judgmentreversed.
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STREET RAILWAYS-NEGLIGENCE-PROSPECTIVE PASSENGER ABOUT
TO BOARD CAR-ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST-The Denver

Tramway Corp. vs. Julia Kuttner-No. 13192-Decided July
23, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Julia Kuttner obtained a judgment for $2,250.00 as damages
against the defendant for personal injuries. She was waiting to board a
street car when the rear trucks of the street car immediately preceding
the car she intended to board failed to follow the front trucks and went
off on a switch track, thereby pinning her between the rear of the car
and an automobile.
1. Where an electrically driven street car is wholly under the control of its owner, and if, while the latter applies or operates it, there is
an accident which cannot be accounted for by any affirmative evidence
reasonably within reach of the one injured thereby, a presumption of
negligence is indulged to constitute a prima facie case of liability.
2. The fact that the plaintiff was not an actual but merely a
prospective passenger does not prevent the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
from applying.
3.
It was a prejudicial error to admit the testimony of a third
party, of a conversation of the claim agent of the defendant, in which
the claim agent made admissions of negligence where the claim agent was
not an eyewitness to the transaction and is not shown to have any authority to speak for the corporation.
4. The rule might be otherwise as to statements made during an
actual negotiation between the one injured and an agent authorized to
make a settlement.
5. The admission of the Claim Agent was not admissible under
the hearsay rule as an admission against interest.
6. General allegations of permanent injuries and inability to follow any gainful occupation, and allegations that the plaintiff be required to expend large sums of money for medical care and treatment

where followed by a Bill of Particulars, are sufficient to admit evidence
of payment for nursing care and attention, cost of medical attention,
past, present and future, and evidence of the fact that plaintiff was a
stenographer, accountant and office employee.-Judgment reversed.
RAPE--SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-REMARKS OF TRIAL COURTBoegel vs. The People--No. 13419-Decided July 23, 1934Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
The defendant was convicted below of statutory rape on a girl
twelve years old. She had a baby as a result thereof and the defendant
did not attempt to establish that any other person had access, but denied
that he ever had sexual intercourse.
1. The evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict of statutory
rape.
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2. After the jury had been out twenty-three hours it was proper
for the Court to advise the jury that they try to agree on a verdict if
they could do so conscientiously.-Judgment affirmed.
ANSWER--SCOPE OF ISSUE-Spangler vs.
Barnes et a.-No. 1349 1-Decided April 23, 1934--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
The original trial in this controversy was had upon the sole question of the delivery of a deed from Willard to Spangler, plaintiff in
error, which the heirs of Willard, who are defendants in error, sought
to have cancelled. Judgment was entered to the effect that there was a
valid delivery. That judgment was reviewed by this Court, reported
in 93 Colo. 254, whereupon the judgment was reversed for further
proceedings, not inconsistent with the views expressed in the opinion.
After the case was remanded to the District Court defendant asked
leave to file an amended answer which was granted and the amendment
filed, and when the case came on for hearing on plaintiff's motion the
Court struck theamended answer and entered decree for plaintiffs, cancelling the deed, fixing the ownership of plaintiffs to the property in
fee and awarded them the right to possession and damages for use of
the property and to review this final judgment error was prosecuted.
1. The Court below erred in striking the amended answer.
2. When, growing out of the same transaction, such matter in
defendant's original answer and amended answer as alleged an equitable interest and right to the possession of the property, were rightfully
pleaded and all questions raised by such original answer and amendment should be adjudicated in this proceeding without the necessity of
a new and separate action.
3. In an action to cancel a deed, the defendant is entitled to be
heard on any fact, proof of which would entitle defendant to ownership of the property, even in the event the deed was ordered cancelled.
-- Judgment reversed with directions to reinstate the amended answer
and proceed to a determination of the issues thereby raised.
PLEADING-AMENDED

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY FOR INJURIES-DEFECTIVE
SIDEWALK-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-Beck vs. City and

County of Denver-No. 13225-Decided April 23, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Mrs. Beck sued the City for $12,500.00 for injuries caused by
defective sidewalk. Jury brought in a verdict for the defendant. The
sole question presented on the review was whether the uncontradicted
evidence shows the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
At the time of the injuries Mrs. Beck was pregnant.
There were a
number of nails protruding from the surface of the sidewalk on which
she stubbed her toe and fell, and this occurred in the nighttime and
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Her eyesight was not good and she
the sidewalk was poorly lighted.
was suffering from other physical disabilities which caused a miscarriage,
outside of the fall.
1. Not every defect in a sidewalk is actionable.
2. Where the person injured is physically impaired the care he
is in duty bound to exercise while walking on a sidewalk is increased
correspondingly.
3.
There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the
plaintiff, in view of the insufficient light, and her own physical condition, was guilty of contributory negligence at the time she fell.
4.
The jury concluded by the verdict that the miscarriage was
not caused by the fall and the evidence supports that finding. Hence,
the verdict must stand.-Judgment affirmed.

AUTOMOBILES-COLLISIONS-NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE--Shirley Garage, Inc. vs. Douglas-No.
13476-Deided March 12, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Bouck.
This is an action for damages arising out of an automobile collision. There are no pleadings, the first trial being before a Justice of
the Peace. On appeal to the County Court the trial was De Novo; jury
waived and judgment entered against the plaintiff company which
is the plaintiff in error, both on its claim against the defendant and on
defendant's counterclaim. The right to enter judgment on the counterclaim is challenged.
1. Where, in the trial of an automobile case a diagram of the
place of accident is used by the witnesses in explanation of their testimony but such map or diagram is not preserved in the bill of exceptions,
such diagram may have been the decisive factor in proving that the
defendant's damage was the natural and direct consequence of plaintiff's negligence.
2.
Even if it be conceded for the purpose of argument that the
record shows that the defendant was guilty of contributory negligence
in disobeying certain traffic regulations, it is apparent that the Court
below believed that such negligence, if any, was not a contributing cause
of the damages sustained by defendant, and under such circumstances
this Court is bound by the conclusions of the trial Court.-Judgment
affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ACCIDENT OR LUMBAGO--Allan et al.
us. Gettler et al.-No. 13469-Decided March 19, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Allan was operating the Crown mine and was insured by a private
company. Gettler was working in the mine. The Commission found
that Gettler sustained accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment and that his injury consisted of a back sprain and was
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temporary, and awarded him compensation. Upon review the District
Court affirmed the award though employer and the insurance company
contended there was no evidence of accidental injury and that what
Gettler suffered from was lumbago.
1. Even though Gettler was suffering from lumbago an injury
to his back caused by lifting heavy timbers would be compemsable.
2. A man who has lumbago, the same as one who has not, may
suffer an accidental strain that is compensable under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The lumbago does not render him immune. from
strain.
3. The Commission's findings are sufficiently supported by the
evidence.--Judgment affirmed.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-FRAUD--BODY JUDGMENT-AGENCY-

Bosick vs. Youngblood-No. 13152-Decided June 12, 1934Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Elizabeth Youngblood sued Charles Bosick and one Higbee in the
court below to recover damages for fraud, based upon misrepresentations in the trade of an apartment building for country real estate and
recovered a judgment for $8,500 and body execution against Bosick,
but the action was dismissed as to Higbee.
1. Where plaintiff employs an agent to sell or exchange her land
and the agent advertises the same and in pursuance of such employment
procures a purchaser and continues to represent the plaintiff, such agent
is the agent of the plaintiff and not of the defendant and plaintiff cannot rely on representations made by such agent as being representations
of the defendant.
2. Where plaintiff enters into a contract to exchange two apartment buildings for country real estate and was given full opportunity
to inspect the country real estate before the trade was consummated and
did inspect it several times and took other parties to see it for the purpose of getting their opinion on it, plaintiff cannot in such case rely
upon alleged false representations of the defendant as to its value and
productivity.
3. If a purchaser of land does not avail herself of the means and
opportunities which are afforded her for acquainting herself with the
character and value of the land, she will not be heard to say that she
has been deceived by the vendor's representations.-Judgmentreversed.
WATERS-ASSESSMENTS ON STOCK OF DIFFERENT CLASSES-REASONABLENESS OF-Robinson vs. The Booth-OrchardGrove Ditch

Co. et al.-No. 13145-Decided March 19, 1934-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Burke.
The irrigation company owns and operates an irrigation ditch and
its stock is divided into three classes based upon the dates of priority.
It amended its articles to permit each class of stock to be assessed for
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ditch maintenance on the basis of benefits. Robinson is an owner of
Class A stock which bore the heaviest assessment, brought this suit to
have the amendment nullified and the company officials enjoined from
further action under it. Defendants demurred. The demurrer was sustained and plaintiff elected to stand and cause was dismissed in Court
below.
1. Where there are threp, different classes of stock in an irrigation company their classifications are based upon priorities and the class
of stock having the earliest priorities are assessed heavier than classes
of stock holding later priorities and each class is entitled to a different
use, and varying therefore in benefits from maintenance, the statute of
Colorado requiring a pro rata assessment requires only that cost shall be
equitably apportioned between the classes and that the assessment an
each share in a given class be the same. -- Judgment affirmed.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY FOR DEATH OF CHLDDROWNING IN RIVER--City and County of Denver vs. Stutzman
-No. 13246-Decided June 12, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice

Bouck.
Mrs. Stutzman, plaintiff below, recovered a judgment for
$1,128.50 against the City and County of Denver for her daughter's
death, alleged to be due to the city's negligence in dredging a hole in
the Platte River, the bed of which was owned by the city, and the child
was drowned by stepping into the hole in the bed of the river.
1. A municipality is liable for the death of a child caused by
stepping into a hole in the bed of a river owned by the city, such hole
being created by the. city in dredging the river for the purpose of l1ood
prevention.
This work was not done in its governmental capacity but was
clearly a local project and not in performance of any governmental duty
imposed upon or delegated to the municipality by the State.
3.
The question of whether the city was guilty of negligence in
not posting signs or otherwise giving warning of the existence of the
hole was properly a question for the jury.
4. The question of whether the child or the mother was guilty
of contributory negligence was properly a question for the jury.Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-WAGES Do NOT INCLUDE TIPS-Industrial Commission of Colorado, et al. vs. Lindvay-No. 13472
-Decided March 19, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Lindvay was a bell boy in the employer company's hotel at Pueblo.
For a compensable injury suffered by him the Industrial Commission
awarded compensation, fixing the average weekly wages at $10.00. He
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appealed to the District Court on the ground that the Commission had
failed to take into consideration tips paid claimant by guests of the
hotel. The District Court included the tips and held the average weekly
wages were $28.00 instead of $10.00 and set aside the Commission's
award.
1. Subdivision (a) in Section 47 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as amended by Session Laws of 1929, page 648, provides that
the term "wages" shall not include gratuities received from employers
or others.
2. This declaration by the Legislature must be enforced until the
Legislature itself sees fit to change it. The language is clear and unambiguous.--Judgment reversed with directions.
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